Freedom of speech in Elizabethan Parliaments
By the mid-sixteenth century it was customary that at the opening of Parliament newly chosen Speakers would request confirmation of the ‘ancient liberties’ of the Commons, namely freedom of speech and ‘privilege’ from arrest during sessions. From the beginning of her reign Elizabeth qualified the former as ‘liberty of speech for the well debating of matters propounded’, thereby reserving to herself control over what the Commons may, and may not, discuss. (Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I, ed. T.E. Hartley, i. 42.) Some Members, however, notably Peter Wentworth and his brother Paul, challenged this restriction on the grounds that traditionally Parliament had a counselling role, no matter how unwelcome, for ‘no estate can stand where the prince will not be governed by advice’ (Procs. i. 431.). On successive occasions a handful of Members doggedly asserted their right to speak openly on any topic. In attempting to silence them it was Elizabeth, rather than the proponents of free speech, who was the innovator. She monitored the Commons via the placement of councillors and courtiers in the Lower House to a greater extent than her predecessors had ever done. (M.A.R. Graves, Elizabethan Parliaments 1559-1601, pp. 49-51.).
The first direct clash over freedom of speech occurred in November 1566 when the Commons, led by Robert Bell, asked the Lords to jointly petition Elizabeth to marry and settle the royal succession. She intervened to block further debate, prompting Paul Wentworth to question whether the queen’s commandment breached ‘the lybertie of the free speache of the Howse’, and if not ‘then what offence is it for anye of the Howse to err in declaryng his opynyon to be otherwyse?’ In response Elizabeth rebuked the Commons not to ‘doute whither a prince that is hed of all the body may not commaund the fete not to stray whan the[y] wold slip’.(Procs. i. 154, 174.) At the opening of the 1571 Parliament her instructions became more explicit than hitherto: the Commons were ‘to meddle with noe matters of state but such as should be propounded unto them, and to occupy themselves in other matters concerning the commenwealth’.(Procs. i. 199.) According to this formula the succession, foreign policy, and anything touching the prerogative including religious debates, were designated off-limits. Nevertheless this was insufficient to silence Bell, who complained about purveyance and licences – a grey area that concerned both commonwealth and prerogative. He was summoned before the Privy Council and returned, as Wentworth later recalled, ‘with such an amazed continnance that it daunted all the House’. Intimidation tactics were also deployed against William Strickland, who was cross-examined and briefly sequestered for introducing a radical bill of religious reforms; his absence roused a brave few to complain that the liberties of the Commons had been infringed, though their protests were quickly quashed by the councillors present.(Procs. i. 202, 237-9, 436.)
An element of self-censorship emerged in both 1572 and 1576 when the Commons took action against its own Members for speeches that were felt to have overstepped the mark. In the first case Arthur Hall was forced to retract his motion for leniency towards Mary Queen of Scots in the wake of the Norfolk conspiracy. Later in the same session when Elizabeth ordered that no rel